The bill becomes a policy only when it passes the legislative branch and executive branch. The legislative or executive branches do not have the ability to implement the policy or law; it is the responsibility of the bureaucracy to implement that policy. It is public employees who work in the bureaucracy. Almost thirty three percent of state and local employees belong to unions. These two parties play a very important role in our government, they are a source of ideas for public policy, and they legally oppose each other class citation , forcing compromises of ideas which are beneficial to the people of the United States of America.
Majone According to the last group of arguments, the legitimacy of European integration and of Community institutions proceeds from the democratic legitimacy of the member states.
Hence the main cause of the legitimacy problem is the progressive shift to majority voting, which weakens the power of the Member States in the name of a supranational common good. For and against — democratic deficit claims and objections According to Follesdal and Hix the Standard version of democratic deficit includes five main claims that can be summarized as follows: First of all, it is usually claimed that EU integration has meant an increase in executive power Council and Commission coupled with a decrease in national parliamentary control.
Secondly, the European Parliament is still too weak and its powers, however increasing, are not enough to compensate for the dominant role of the executive. Follesdal and Hix, Each one of four major bodies of the EU is the recipients of some kind of criticism: The European Parliament is still the only directly elected body, but mainly on the basis of national issues, the Commission is perceived as a technocracy, the ECJ is unusually powerful and the Council of Ministers is only indirectly accountable and its deliberations remain secret Moravcsik, This is a quite comprehensive list of the main perceived problems in European politics.
Different authors then, starting from different theoretical assumptions, focus on some problems while neglecting others, while some authors like Majone and Moravcsik tend to deny them altogheter. Majone: Procedural Legitimacy and Regulatory governance Majone denies the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU arguing that the EU, being a sui generis kind of polity needs to be assessed according to particular standards.
He therefore rejects many of the democratic deficit claims, because, in its opinion, they are based on wrong analogies. Secondly, the EU is a system of limited competences and has a restricted budget.
The EU is a power-sharing system quasi- federal with vertical and horizontal separation of powers that guarantee checks and balances and its abundance of non-majoritarian features is in line with the necessity of managing a plural society divided along different cleavages linguistic, geographical, economic, ideological and, especially, the division between large and small member states.
Finally objections are also made to the third group of democratic deficit claims. If, in the past, social policies have been an essential source of democratic legitimation for the nation state, it is unlikely that the same would happen for the EU. According to Majone this is due, first of all, to the reluctance of the member states to transfer the necessary competences and resources to the Community.
In sum, the attempt to legitimate the Community through social policy would actually aggravate the resistance to integration, instead of making the EU more legitimate. According to Majone the delegation of important policy-making powers to non-majoritarian institutions, which is happening both at national and to a greater extent at European level, is the main cause of concern about democratic legitimacy.
First of all, it is highly debatable that economic integration enjoyes the support of European voters. Economy is indeed a much more competitive arena than politics, with no guaranteed rights for losers. The fact that European economic integration has so far been perceived as a positive endeavour, was its ability to guarantee economic growth for all participants.
Things are however coming under discussion now that Europe as a whole is facing a deep recession and some countries are worse-off. The support for economic integration should not be taken as granted, as well as the support for political integration cannot be dismissed tout-court if no real endeavour has been made to build it. The depolititicisation of the European arena is not to be taken as a given condition, due to the fact that citizens still perceive themselves as citizens of the member states.
There is no unsurmountable impediment for the two arenas national and European to co-exist and for the gap between economic and political integration to be reduced somehow.
Majone then considers another sense in which the expression democratic deficit is used. In my opinion this is the most important concern but Majone does not tackle the problem because it is not a purely European phenomenon. In fact, he explicitly admits that national institutions are undemocratic and uses this as a justification for the EU to behave in the same way.
He is in fact arguing that non-majoritarian institutions are key to the smooth functioning of the EU and should better remain as they are. This defence of the status quo, is totally focused on output legitimacy and seems to suggest that a shift of focus towards input legitimacy participation would render the functioning of the EU impossible.
Moravcsik: liberal-intergovernmentalism and derived legitimacy Another famous contention that the democratic deficit is a misperception comes from another preminent author such as Moravcsik.
Starting from this assumption, the main focus of analysis therefore remain the power and preferences of its Member States. The source of legitimation of European policy-making is the democratic character of national institutions.
Deliberation is limited to the national arena, while inter-state relationships follow the logic of bargaining. According to this view, the supranational character of European institutions is neglected in favour of a bargaining approach, which helps assimilating the European polity and its functioning to general theories of international relations. Contrary to Majone, Moravcsik rejects the characterization of the EU as a sui generis phenomenon. Starting from this assumption, he claims that the EU should not be compared to nation states or to an abstract conceptions of plebiscitary democracy and thus rejects the existence of a democratic deficit.
Given its intergovernmental nature, the EU cannot be judged according to the standards of a state, since it is much more constrained in its actions and performs a limited number of functions. By these standards Moravcsik argues that the democratic deficit is unsupported by empirical evidence. According to him, existing checks and balances are much better engineered that those of the member states and thus sufficient to ensure enough transparency, effectiveness and responsiveness of EU policy-making.
Democratic deficit claims, according to this author, are based on comparison with an utopian form of deliberative democracy that overlooks the importance of delegation, which is indeed widespread in modern democracies. Indeed, according to Moravcsik, the EU is specializing in functions that involve less direct political participation while the functions that induce popular participation remain largely national.
All in all, according to Moravcsik, the democratic deficit is a myth that needs to be debunked. There are many constraints on EU policy-making and, in its view, these are certainly more powerful than in the Member States. First of all, there are substantive constraints, due to the limited and attributed competences of the EU, of which the main focus remains on cross-border economic activity. This is a modest part of those performed by modern states and is duly restricted by treaty and practice.
New emerging areas are usually subject to stronger intergovernmental procedures and allow for many exceptions and opt-outs. All in all, the EU prerogatives remain primarily economic, while inroads into other areas are limited to cross-border flows.
Although the European Union has a mandate to bring all of these standards, the European Union lacks these basic standards for their overall institution. The rise of the democratic deficit has arisen from many undemocratic characteristics of EU institutions, and a lack of a demos Is the EU Democratic? One of the most controversial debates in the history of European Union EU is if there is a democratic deficit in the EU.
On the one hand, many scholars argued that the democratic deficit exists in the EU.
Proceduralized popular sovereignty and a political system tied in to the peripheral networks of the political public sphere go hand-in-hand with the image of a decentered society. He therefore rejects many of the democratic deficit claims, because, in its opinion, they are based on wrong analogies. The fact that European economic integration has so far been perceived as a positive endeavour, was its ability to guarantee economic growth for all participants.
A reduction of the gap between economic and political integration is as necessary as unlikely and this has to start not only at the institutional level but even more at the level of culture and the public sphere.
This is the essence of democracy, according to the authors. Different theoretical perspectives, indeed, provide different explanations of the origins of the democratic shortcomings of the EU.
Given the contested nature of the European polity, assessing its degree of democracy is problematic.
If, in the past, social policies have been an essential source of democratic legitimation for the nation state, it is unlikely that the same would happen for the EU. Most of the authors concentrate on possible reforms of the institutional set up of the Union to render it more representative or on procedures to render it more accountable. The depolititicisation of the European arena is not to be taken as a given condition, due to the fact that citizens still perceive themselves as citizens of the member states. The EU budget corresponds to 1. The first view stresses the vertical and hierarchical features of its institutional set-up, while the second focuses on the horizontal dynamics between participant member states. Institutional reforms such as the ones proposed by Follesdal and Hix direct election of the Commission president, more transparent meetings of the Council etc.
A polity where the degree of insulation of policy-making is so high as to allow it to be defined as a regulatory state, which can do without participation and has to rely on a set of complex arrangements to justify its perceived shortcomings cannot be defined as a democracy.
There is no reason why they should be isolated from democratic contestation. The rise of the democratic deficit has arisen from many undemocratic characteristics of EU institutions, and a lack of a demos Is the EU Democratic? Hence the main cause of the legitimacy problem is the progressive shift to majority voting, which weakens the power of the Member States in the name of a supranational common good. There are however limits to the concept of democracy.
The two are interdependent. Eriksen and J. The democratic deficit, indeed, rests not only in the blurred chain of delegation from national governments to European institutions, not even only in the lack of inter-institutional accountability and co-ordination at the European level but above all in a general lack of information about the EU system and in the consequent lack of interest and participation by common people. On the other hand, information and discursive practices are the first step for citizens to become involved in the political process by deciding the salience of an issue and pushing for it in the institutional arena. The bill becomes a policy only when it passes the legislative branch and executive branch. This defence of the status quo, is totally focused on output legitimacy and seems to suggest that a shift of focus towards input legitimacy participation would render the functioning of the EU impossible.
A similar problem arises if we assume that the EU is little more than an international organization.
In other words contested polities also require non-majoritarian sources of legitimacy and this is one of the main reasons for the complex institutional set-up of the EU. That between efficiency and redistribution is a continuum that runs from purely technical decisions consumer standards and health protection to policies with clear net contributors and beneficiaries multiannual framework programmes. This could possibly help fostering a meaningful dialogue and a more immediate relationship between the EU and its citizens. According to him, existing checks and balances are much better engineered that those of the member states and thus sufficient to ensure enough transparency, effectiveness and responsiveness of EU policy-making.